Transcript 0:00 [on-hold music] Welcome back to Startup Health Now, the podcast where we celebrate the entrepreneurs and innovators shaping the future of health. I'm Logan Plaster. 0:18 Before we get into this week's episode, just a word about Startup Health's Moonshot Impact Fund. 0:23 For accredited investors, this fund makes it easy to gain exposure to a diversified portfolio of private health innovation companies. 0:30 You can find all the details, as well as sign up for an upcoming informational webinar at healthmoonshot.com. Now on to today's show. 0:39 This week we're getting tactical with two founders from the Startup Health family to talk about sales strategies. Our first guest is Reid Mullins, the VP of Strategic Partnerships at Press Ganey. 0:50 Mullins is well known in our community for co-founding Doctor.com and scaling it over most of a decade before being acquired by Press Ganey last year. 0:58 Our second guest is Brian Nieman, the CEO and founder of Sanguine Biosciences. Brian built his clinical trials platform from zero to eight-figure revenue today. 1:08 The conversation, which was held in front of a live audience of Startup Health founders, was moderated by Katya Hancock, partner and investor network director here at Startup Health. Stick around. 1:20 [on-hold music] Today we're really gonna be talking about sales. 1:28 Um, and these two gentlemen, Reid Mullins from Doctor.com, Brian Nieman from Sanguine, um, they are extremely good at sales, both individually but also building effective sales organizations that have generated significant revenue. 1:42 Uh, without further ado, I'm gonna ask these guys to introduce themselves. Um, Reid, why don't you start us off? Um, tell us a little bit about yourself. 1:50 Um, what was your-- what's your role at Doctor.com, um, which is, if you guys haven't heard, it has now been acquired by Press Ganey, um, at the end of last year, which, um, is just awesome. 2:03 We're, you know, phenomenally proud of, of that. But tell us about your role at Doctor.com because I know you're, you know, you're a co-founder, extremely instrumental in, in the successful outcome there. 2:15 Um, and then also I think it'd be interesting to hear personally, um, you know, what do you attribute your kind of natural salesman procl-proclivity to? 2:24 Is there any like, you know, family member who inspired you or, you know, it, it seems to come so naturally to you. But tell us about yourself and Doctor.com. That's a, that's a significant tee up. Thank you, Katya. 2:36 I re-really appreciate that. [laughs] Um, so, uh, at, at Doctor I was one of the founders, um, and was chief strategy officer. 2:43 Um, but in many ways, what my everyday role was, was the development of new markets, um, and the assessment as to whether we had product market fit. 2:53 Um, and the way I kind of did that and thought about it was effectively selling ahead of wherever we were based on whatever tools we had in our, in our toolbox to completely new markets. 3:04 And so what that meant was in the very, very early days, I was assessing product market fit with individual doctors and managed to close a bunch of individual docs. 3:12 And then we're like, "Oh, I bet we can actually sell this to bigger groups." So started approaching mid-market, you know, folks with like thirty, fifty, national footprint, uh, provider sets and closed a few of those. 3:22 And we're like, "All right, well, how do we apply some of these same tools maybe into the payer space?" So ended up closing our first, uh, health plans. 3:29 And I'm like, "All right, well, now we have a bunch of tools and we have engagement. How do we make that fit? Uh, maybe pharma would be interested." 3:34 Um, and so we started pitching pharmaceutical companies and started bringing them in as clients. 3:38 And, and in a lot of ways, what my role was, um, all revolved around looking at the tools we had access to, trying to figure out if there was some market that could utilize them in a way that we hadn't necessarily imagined it yet, and then do just as many pitches as I could to as many people as possible, all while being very transparent around the fact that, like, we had never applied this particular technology into their particular market. 4:03 Um, but the, the firm belief that it was very possible and that the understanding of the tech as well as the understanding of their market, um, put me in a position where I could convince people to take a flyer on us. 4:14 Um, and so sometimes it was like innovation folks, um, but more often it was just buyers. 4:19 Just buyers in particular institutions who had a progressive mandate to try to figure out how they're gonna evolve their institutions. 4:26 Um, I haven't talked about it like I was a, uh, like an explorer hacking my way through the jungle. 4:30 And so I, I, I pitched so many things to so many institutions for so many years, and you'd be, like, hacking your way through the jungle until you find a place where there's, like, arable land and two rivers meet, and you're like, "Oh, there's actually product market fit here. 4:44 This is a place where we need to, like, at least set up base camp." 4:47 And I would bring in, like, a little SWAT team of mostly product people, um, and some client success folks to start handling the first customers we were able to get set up in that little base camp, in that place with arable land. 4:58 And then once we really established what the client was gonna get and how we were gonna do it and it felt repeatable, um, then I would, like, put my hat on and sharpen my hatchet and, like, head back into the woods and try to find another place where there was sort of arable land and an opportunity to try to sort of build something. 5:14 I, I accredit almost all of that. Um, my dad was an entrepreneur who ended up landing in the car business and running these giant national sales teams. 5:22 Um, and so I spent, like, my whole childhood, like, playing at car dealerships with the nitty-grittiest salespeople I have ever met in my life, then or now. 5:31 Um, and so it just, it's become a, an important part and sort of the ongoing part of my career. Sorry. There's a lot to dig into there. 5:38 Um, you know, because you, you, you make it sound like, oh, we just sort of jumped from lily pad to lily pad, from, from small to medium provider to payers to pharma. 5:47 But each of those steps was a significant, uh, you know, thought out milestones that you achieved. Um, and so I, I would love to dig into kind of how long it took you to go from one to the other. 6:02 Um, but let's, let's have Brian do his introduction. Um, and, you know, I just...Just kind of preface a follow-up later question. 6:10 I think a lot of people on this call are still trying to figure out product market fit, and they're trying to, they're trying to figure out, um, time management. 6:18 So if you've got one customer that's actually already paying, but you don't think that's the, the big kahuna opportunity for your future strategy, how do you figure out where to allocate resources and that kind of thing? 6:29 Um, so that I think is something to dig into. Brian, why don't you introduce yourself. Thank you for being with us. Well, uh, thanks for having me on, Katya. Uh, so, 6:40 uh, my background, I started the company about ten years ago, uh, from scratch with my partner, Gerald Lee. He's also a startup health transformer. 6:48 And, uh, uh, re- we've taken very limited amount of funding at a total of five million, and we've gone to a place where, uh, we're generating a, a good chunk of revenue with that, um, into the eight digits of revenue annually. 7:04 So, um, yeah, I'm, I'm happy to be here, answer any questions. And, um, what our company does, I'll give you some feedback on that. There's, uh, some information on that. 7:15 We help serve, uh, pharmaceutical companies and patients by making it easier for patients to participate in research. 7:22 We have a staff of about a hundred fifty mobile phlebotomists and nurses that go to patients' homes to draw blood and other specimens, and then provide that specimen and related data, including medical records and patient-reported outcome surveys, to, uh, researchers at, uh, you know, the smallest of the small, uh, buddy, um, biotech companies, all the way to the largest, uh, pharma companies in the world. 7:45 So, uh, COVID was an interesting ride where, um, at the end of Q1, every client put their existing projects in, say, lupus and sickle cell on pause and, uh, uh, turned on... 7:58 You know, every client, um, wanted to do, uh, a COVID research, so a big, uh, pause and then a big rebound. 8:06 And then we're seeing that now, um, uh, come back to, uh, the earlier normal, which was research on all conditions, not just COVID, COVID Delta. So happy to, uh, share any of, of my experiences with the folks today. 8:22 And Brian, was there anything in your background, um, where you pulled a lot of sales knowledge from, whether it was personal relationships or a mentor, anything like that? Yeah. 8:33 Uh, similar to Reid, though, uh, um, you know, his, his father, it sounds like his father had plenty of, uh, formal training and experience, so that's great. 8:43 Um, you know, my, my parents, my uncle, father, uh, were entrepreneurs in the wireless, like cellphone space back when, um, you didn't go directly to Apple, and not everyone had the iPhone, right? You had, you had LG. 8:57 You had these different, uh, types you could look at. So, um, both in retail and in wholesale, so B2B and B2C, I ha- I had some exposure, uh, on that level, but, um, nothing formal in that regard. Awesome. 9:12 So both of you, um, I'm gonna assume, tell me if I'm wrong, were the first salesperson [chuckles] at your companies. Um, I'm sure your co-founders were also everyone-- it was all hands on deck. Mm-hmm. 9:24 Um, but you were leading the charge. Um, so Reid, walk us back to those early days. Um, you know, you talked about, like I said, jumping from kind of one to the next. 9:34 But in the early days, um, how were you thinking a- about your approach and your, your strategy? Um, and how long did it take you? 9:42 You know, I, I, I believe you had, um, something like tens of thousands of private practice clients at the time of acquisition- Mm-hmm. Hundreds of health systems. Mm-hmm. 9:52 Um, extremely impressive, and then that's not even to get into your partnerships with payers and, and pharma. But in those early days, what, what was your strategy and what were you setting out to do? 10:02 What kind of milestones were you putting out there for yourself? Yeah, it's a great question. Um, you know, in the very earliest days, uh, doctor.com was just a domain, um, that had a doctor directory on it. 10:15 It was effectively like a broken apart version of NPES, made a little prettier and wrapped around with ads. So most of our revenue, maybe half our revenue, just came from AdSense. 10:25 And then we were saying, "Okay, uh, CPMs are pretty low in the market space that we're in. We would love to get direct advertising." And so we sat down to say, "All right, how do we get direct advertising?" And 10:37 the plan effectively became me cold calling brands that I thought would be interested in the demo that was using the site. And so we got really good at, um, understanding the demographics of the site. 10:50 And what we discovered was that it was, like mostly women, head of household, college educated, um, sort of care-- sort of master of care for the household. 10:59 And so with that demographic profile, um, I just ran around and tried to find people who I knew would be interested. 11:05 So we, uh-- My favorite [chuckles] was I started picking up Martha Stewart Living magazine in the grocery store, and I assumed that anyone who was paying to advertise in Martha Stewart Living magazine wanted to advertise on doctor.com, they just didn't know about us yet. 11:17 And so I just brute force went through those lists, finding the people at those institutions that I thought would be the right, sort of the right folks, um, and called them and pitched like at least ten different custom things, most of which didn't exist, but just trying to like capture their attention and interest. 11:33 Um, and eventually had enough dialogue with them that I understood that there was a product that we could deploy that'd be beneficial for them, which was, um, like customized content. 11:43 They didn't wanna just buy banner ads around doctor pages. They wanted customized content that lived on a doctor.com subdomain that they could make one of the cores of their online marketing strategies. 11:54 And w- that wasn't my idea, that was one of their ideas. Um, and we just took it and ran with it. And so we started adding direct advertising revenue, which just crushed all the CPM numbers that we had. 12:04 And from there it became clear that there was sort of broader opportunities with the platform. It was getting enough traffic. 12:11 And so, you know, uh, we did kind of what Brian describes, just like you're, you're revenue positive and now you start investing in the next product set, um, as you try to sort of grow the business. 12:21 And the thing that we added was the ability for doctors to claim their own profiles.Because we assumed some amount of the traffic that was coming to the site was doctors googling themselves. 12:30 We know that doctors do that, and so we didn't know how frequently it was happening. We didn't know if there was an engaged audience there. 12:36 But as soon as we added the ability for them to update their own information, um, we started watching like tens and then dozens, and then hundreds, and then thousands of doctors actually claiming their profiles. 12:47 And so we want to understand like, what were they doing? What did it look like? So we started installing tools on the provider-facing side of the site, um, to let us observe what their behavior was. 12:58 And a company called Lucky Orange had just come out with a really nice tool that would let you watch in real-time as people did the actions on the page. 13:07 It was basically just like click tracking and, and mouse tracking and producing like a live video for you to, to see. 13:13 And so we started observing like what doctors were doing on the site, where they were paying more attention, what aspects of the profile were most interesting. 13:20 And so once we understood that they were m-mostly interested in putting up a photo, they were mostly interested in updating their phone numbers, um, it became clear to me that they were trying to sort of own their online presence to the extent that was possible. 13:34 And so I started just calling every doctor that signed up. Fifteen minutes after a sign-up, they would get a phone call. Um, and I started pitching them all kinds of different things. 13:43 I pitched them building them websites. I pitched them doing online scheduling. I pitched them, uh, like sort of managing presence around the web. 13:51 I pitched them AdWords packages, just like a-anything I could think of just to see where people got most excited. 13:57 And I, and I made sure in those really, really early days talking to an individual doctor that if the call, um, ended with them excited but not willing to take out their credit card and actually buy a thing, um, it was like, "Nah, they're interested." 14:12 But if I could get someone to take out their credit card and read me the number, and I would, I wouldn't even write it down. I didn't have anything to sell them at, at the time. I was just sort of practicing. 14:20 Um, I would let them read me their credit card number, and then I'd call them back two days later and be like, "Hey, really sorry. We decided to sunset that beta. That product's not gonna be available. 14:28 But, you know, if you're interested, I could put you on the mailing list," blah, blah, blah. 14:32 And, and so in that way, just getting enough content and feedback, um, around really how people were interested in what they were interested in, and whether they were willing to go to that final step. 14:42 'Cause you can have like a lot of great conversations, but if it doesn't end with them taking out their credit card, like that's not, still not really a sale. So that- Mm-hmm. 14:50 In, in the very early days, it was like me trying to learn everything I could learn, not 'cause I wanted to be our only sales guy, um, but because I needed- Right... 14:58 to understand where we were trying to push the business and where it was gonna work. 15:03 And that's really interesting because, you know, I-- in, in the early stages of any business, you're, you're trying to find product market fit, you're trying to find what people are interested in, but you also don't wanna come across like you're just throwing spaghetti against the wall. 15:17 Exactly. Um, and so what ha- what do you attribute those early successful conversations to? 15:23 Is-- was it sort of like a fake it till you make it, come in with a confident product offering, even if it's not your, your strategy for sure? Oh, yeah. 15:31 So here's actually one of the places where having a partner was really important. So Andre is, uh, like really an, an artist. 15:37 He graduated with a degree from art school, an amazing designer, and so he was making these very professional-looking decks for products that didn't exist. 15:45 Um, and then I was walking through these conversations very confidently selling a product that I knew didn't exist just to see if I could get them enthusiastic enough to do it. 15:53 And so we had a bunch of different decks for a bunch of different products. And in no one conversation did I throw too much out. 15:59 In every individual conversation, it was like, "Okay, we're gonna experiment with selling this person an AdWords consulting package. Okay, in this pitch, we're gonna experiment with selling them a, a website product. 16:10 In this pitch, we're gonna experiment with..." and just so on and so forth, and just did them at scale. 16:14 And like, I didn't feel like I knew whether I had product market fit until I'd collected like a dozen credit cards on something, um, because- Mm-hmm... 16:22 you know, even a-- I wanna say even a stopped clock is right twice a day. If you make enough phone calls, someone will buy something. That doesn't mean you have product market fit. It means you got one person to say yes. 16:32 And so I was really trying to hit scale before we spent any time or money developing anything. Yeah. That's really interesting. 16:40 You were definitely combining your sales process with the early product development- Mm-hmm... 16:46 um, which, which is a common attribute you hear in, in success stories, is just maniacally getting feedback, incorporating that, investing in your customers to keep improving, that kind of thing. 16:58 Um, Brian, same question to you. Tell us what it looked like in the, in the early days. Um, was pharma always your customer? Um, and have you stayed kind of on that one track? 17:10 And, and how was your-- how did your strategy start out and evolve? Yeah. So I feel like, uh, uh, our path, my path was similar to Reed's. 17:23 Um, and I, and I am guessing it's probably not dissimilar from other entrepreneurs, which are, you know, on the disc assessment, high, high D dominant personalities, 17:36 um, that wanna get a script and a phone book and just smile and dial. You know, it's a lot of energy there. So I, I-- so we definitely went down that path. 17:47 We did not have that same product market fit, um, as it, as it's defined, um, in the last example, because we always knew we were gonna sell to early-stage discovery researchers, um, in the preclinical world. 18:04 So there wasn't really a discussion around that. 18:07 It was more about the product market fit, depending on how you wanna stretch the definition, for us was really, um, what diseases or therapeutic areas, um, do-- did we wanna focus on? Is it oncology? Is it rare disease? 18:23 Is it autoimmune, infectious disease? 18:25 So that was kind of our product market fit exercise, and we found that we were really, um, better suited, given our model of engaging patients and going directly to the home.Um, we thought that, uh, that fit better with rare diseases that, um, 18:43 uh, where children are mainly afflicted and, uh, in autoimmune conditions where mobility is, you know, not always, you know, where you have flares and pain crisis in those episodes. 18:55 So we really had, um, uh, we really found that that was our niche, and what, what we found is that, and this is where it gets into sales, is that if you know that you're good at something and that one or two specific things that you're better than at anybody else, that's where you're going to, uh, have the most engagement. 19:16 So what we've noticed is that in autoimmune conditions such as lupus and rheumatoid arthritis and, uh, rare diseases such as sickle cell and Duchenne muscular dystrophy, our win rate on projects is, um, you know, north of sixty-five percent. 19:31 So the likelihood of the researcher working with us is exceptionally high. But then you look at other conditions such as oncology, which isn't our specialty, it's lower than twenty percent. 19:41 So, uh, that's where we're, uh, tracking as it relates to, you know, product market fit and how we got started. 19:48 So it was really a journey of we know the customers, now what, what variety or what modification of our product, uh, will work best for them. 19:58 And so we've, we've now, uh, identified and defined what specific conditions, uh, within which therapeutic areas are interesting. 20:08 So when we do a, now we're getting into like product marketing exercise, what we did is we pulled a list of all of the, uh, uh, public and private pharmaceutical companies in the United States and then went through each of their publicly available pipelines and defined whether, you know, what conditions they have. 20:24 We tallied that, and then we assigned a numeric value onto... Let's say there was a company, um, that had lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and Crohn's disease, which are our specialties, but they were smaller. 20:36 That company would have a higher priority than a larger customer, um... 20:42 That company would have a higher priority than, uh, a larger client with, um, let's say, oncology and a big R&D budget, but conditions which we weren't specialized in. 20:53 So we actually went through and did that market sizing exercise. And then, you know, this, the next part is kind of advanced. 21:00 We assigned, uh, uh, inside sales and outside sales folks to those specific territories, which we can discuss later, but wanted to just give you a spectrum. 21:09 We knew what we were specialized in, then we found other companies that could fit that sort of mold, where we knew we had, um, kind of a cheat code, so to speak, of winning specific projects, and then we replicated, um, success. 21:26 That's awesome. 21:27 It sounds a little like a, a thing that we did in the early days, which was, um, once we knew what product we were selling, we would, like, meticulously track the competitors that other folks would ask us about. 21:39 Either they said they were using, or how are you guys different from this? And we would just track all that. 21:43 And because this was also marketing centric, it became pretty standard for us to, um, figure out ways to identify which of our customers were using which of our competitors. 21:53 So way back in the day, there was a lot of, like, battle over the marketing dollar of the private practice doctor. I mean, Zocdoc was a big name in that space. We were in New York. They were in New York. 22:03 So people kept asking, like, "How are you guys different from Zocdoc?" It's one of those competitors we identified. 22:07 And so every month, every six weeks, we would just run a scraper harvester through Zocdoc and find every single person that was paying Zocdoc. 22:15 And then we would feed that all into Salesforce, and we would assign that to SDRs to reach out, and in the midst of the conversation, be like, "Hey, you know, I, I see you're using Zocdoc. How do you like it?" 22:25 And depending on what the person said, we had a pitch that was, like, in line with their reaction or response. Person goes, "Oh, you know, I used to... I signed up for it two years ago. It was great. 22:36 Now I'm just not getting as many patients." We'd be like, "Dude, I know. Everybody says that. You know, the problem is that they're not everywhere around the web. You should use our product," blah, blah, blah. 22:43 Or they're like, "Oh, it's actually great. I get a ton of patients." Be like, "Dude, that's amazing. If that works well for you, this is gonna work well too. 22:49 It's the same function and feature, you know, get out in front of the patient in a consumer web." And so we would, like, pick a, a, a competitor. 22:56 We would find a way to scrape up every single doctor that was using that competitor, and then we'd develop these little customized pitches, and we would send the sales team after them. 23:05 Um, that way the, the salespeople aren't doing any prospecting, and they can just pick up the phone and just run dial after dial on the same kind of talk track. Um, 23:15 very important to try to find ways to, you know, to Ryan's point, kind of hack some of those early decisions around who you're gonna contact and what are you gonna say. 23:24 Because i-if you can't figure out a way to scale who you're gonna contact and what are you gonna say, then you're always stuck having, like, a very senior person who is likely sort of, like, founder level and could be focusing on other stuff. 23:36 You're gonna have them doing this, like, pretty rote grind. Um, because sales, and especially the kind of outbound phone-based sales, is very much a rote grind. 23:46 Um, but it's the best way to get the most feedback the fastest. Mm-hmm. And, and there's definitely, you know, a conversation to be had around the different environment with an outbound phone-based sale, you know, to 24:02 small to mid-size practices versus more the enterprise sales. Um- Absolutely. And at what point, at what point did you start spending more of your time... 24:12 You know, you, you kind of had this revenue base with the small to mid-size practices, Reid, and then what point did you start saying, "Okay, I'm gonna spend X percentage of my time evaluating or learning from, you know, payers and, and pharma where there are these much larger deals to be had"? 24:30 Um, because I'm a selfish person, I made that decision very early. I did not wanna be doing that rote grind. 24:35 So the mi-the minute we had legitimate professional salespeople being run in a bullpen by a professional sales manager, um, I started spending most of my time onDevelopment. 24:47 So it started with, like, just bigger practices, so I could leverage the work we'd done before. And then whenever I got an opportunity to pitch a payer or pitch pharma or pitch a hospital, I would take it. 24:56 Um, but as, as quickly as possible- Mm-hmm... I, I saw myself as, as development and really business development, and that that ongoing repetitive sale is the-- that is the area of professionals. 25:07 There are people that are specifically that. And just a more tactical question, I think for both of you. At what point is it appropriate to bring in a sales manager 25:19 to manage your sales team versus, you know, someone that the founder... Is-- Was there like a trigger where you said, "Okay, now it-- this makes sense"? 25:28 So for us, we, we made the call, um, once I'd collected like a, a dozen and a half credit cards on the same product. I was like- Mm-hmm... this is saleable. Someone else can do this now. Mm-hmm. 25:37 And so we, we found someone who was... And we did, we did this a lot through the early days, was find someone who kind of has, like, hit a s- a glass ceiling in the-- at their current employer. 25:48 You know, especially on the sales side, there's this thing that happens where very talented salespeople get stuck because they're generating so much revenue for their employer that the employer doesn't wanna promote them, like, doesn't wanna move them out of the role. 26:00 Like, it's... You, you get, you get trapped as a salesperson. And so we very specifically went out there looking for someone who aspired towards sales management and sales training and loved to coach- Mm-hmm... 26:10 but was currently a sales rep, and where we could position to them and say, "Hey, listen, you know, you're gonna join us as a rep just like you are now. 26:18 But unlike your current environment, like, we explicitly want you to get good at this pitch and then find people and train them into it. We want you to run the team that we're building." 26:28 And so that, that was our sort of early strategy. And so Jorge joined the team. I think there were only four of us at the time, or five of us at the time, really early. 26:37 It's tough because it depends on how much capital you have to deploy, and, uh, we didn't have any. 26:46 So what we did is we, uh, ended up working with a group called, uh, Predictable Revenue, who would do the prospecting work for us. Um, and... 26:55 'cause I knew that I, you know, I wasn't gonna be prospecting as CEO of the company. So we sent it out to Predictable Revenue to prospect. And then once they got us the meeting, 'cause really this is enterprise, right? 27:07 I mean, however you're looking, selling it to Pfizer is, you know, it, it's a whole thing. 27:12 So, uh, the, the thought process was that if we could, if we could prospect and, uh, you know, I could close, or we had like a sale-- uh, kind of like a product specialist, like sales engineer on, uh, the call at the time. 27:27 So the... Or, uh, at the company at the time. So the idea was that the, uh, if we could prove that we could prospect this, that was the most important thing, and then if we could close it. 'Cause I knew we could close. 27:40 The question is, would prospecting work? So that's-- that was the question that we need to answer for ourselves, because we have more of an enterprise, uh, level sale. 27:49 You know, like, you know, no researchers are picking up the phone. So it's like th-this email... Like, do email cadences work? So we wanted to prove that out, and we did. And then, um, 28:02 uh, I think the first thing we did was, uh, if we proved prospecting worked, I couldn't close anymore because I was, you know, uh, you know, I didn't have the time. So we-- So I decided I'm gonna s- train some closers. 28:17 So we hired a couple of account executives, um, which are doing phenomenally now. And then I said, "Okay, well, you know, this throughput of the prospecting isn't high enough. 28:30 You know, we're not sending out enough emails. We're not getting enough meetings." So we-- After, you know, four years of Predictable Revenue, we decided to bring it in-house. 28:40 So, uh, our first sales development reps we hired towards the end of twenty nineteen, and, uh, one of them happened to be a senior sales development rep, 28:51 and she just did so well during COVID and, uh, I know, I know she wanted some, um, uh, you know, advancement in her career. And so she became the sales, sales development manager. 29:02 She started off with two or three, uh, SDRs, which basically is like outbound prospecting. And, uh, um, we are now at, you know, after a year and a half, uh, of her in that role, we're up to twelve outbound SDRs. 29:17 So she's doing phenomenally well there. And, uh, we're still trying to develop the playbook for closing. So, um, I've identified one of our, uh, 29:29 uh, account executives who would transition to the sales manager role probably in, you know, uh, nine months from now. So that's, uh, that's been our path. Really it's the question, was prospecting gonna work for us? 29:43 And, uh, that's been- Mm-hmm... the biggest thing. So I, I would like to talk about the playbook for closing, um, because it's, it's often, uh, the hardest part to get a meeting, right? 29:55 And, and people have great meetings all day long. Um, and y- I talk to so many entrepreneurs who say, "Everyone loves it when we have a meeting." 30:04 You know, but it's managing that sales process, getting them through the funnel, and then closing. You know, so we'd just love to hear what were the, the things that you guys learned along the way that... 30:15 The things that you did wrong, and then the things you figured out were kind of key to getting people over the line. Um, for us, I think what became the most important thing was the quiet follow-up conversation. 30:31 That c-c-coming into it, it was very clear very fast that, like, you know, you get fifteen person, fifteen people from enterprise on a call, and you have like four people from your team around. 30:40 It's like kind of tw- it looks like this screen. It's like, it's like you're on this webinar- Yeah... on a call. 30:45 Um, no one ever buys anything in that environment.There just, it just isn't the right environment for someone to decide they're gonna spend that money, um, or commit those resources. 30:53 Instead, what we started doing was using these calls to run giant discovery, and mostly to suss out who was our main champion and who was our main detractor, and then wrapping those calls, trying to get as tight as we can with the champion, and to the extent we thought it was possible, see if we can get in good with the detractor. 31:11 Because in many cases, folks that were detractors on those calls didn't-- wasn't about the software service, wasn't even about the value props. It was like, it was, it was always something different. 31:21 But if you could get in front of them in a quieter room, um, you could get an opportunity to elicit from them what their actual objections were and what their issue was with, with go forward. 31:33 And so we would just be, like, putting ourselves on the same side of the table as our champion. "Hey, what do you need internally? Like, how does procurement work? You know, what does this actually look like? 31:42 What can we get you? Have, have you, have you done this before? [chuckles] You know, if not, should we talk to your boss? How can I..." 31:47 And just, like, feeding your champion everything, and then using the big calls to suss out who might be giving them a hard time and see if you can make them champions, um, in these sort of, like, quieter dialogues. 31:58 That became super important for us is, is, is that sort of picking your marks process. Mm-hmm. I, I can definitely, um, relate to that. 32:08 As, as most of you know, I'm in- really involved with the fundraising at Sort of Health. 32:13 And there's almost always a, a close relationship that, that develops between someone on our team, whether it's Steve or me or Unity and the champion, um, if we're-- especially if we're talking about a strategic investor who you, you text before or after the meeting, or you get on a phone call and whatever you can do to figure out what, what makes that person look good to their boss or what do they really need, um, those little nuggets can make all the difference in just developing those relationships. 32:43 So I totally agree with that. Um, anything else, Brian, in terms of things you've discovered about the, you know, the playbook for closing over the years? Yeah. Um, [chuckles] 32:58 and depending on how you define, uh, closing, if you ta- if you're talking about maximizing your win rate, I feel like the best way to maximize your win rate is to scrutinize the prospecting even better, so like lead qualification calls. 33:13 So for us, it's been, like, discussing budget as soon as possible with a client, uh, has been the most important thing. Um, and, uh, uh, what their, like, uh, price per visit or price per sample 33:31 and the lens at which they've been looking at things. So if they're looking at a... I, I think they're moving from a price-based or cost-based, uh, sale to a more of a value-based sale was pretty critical for us 33:47 because, uh, the way we separate ourselves from the competitors was we, you know, we charge more than they do, but if you, uh, in aggregate, but on a per data point basis, we actually charge less. 33:58 So what I mean by that is that the competitors often, uh, provide just the blood sample, with Sangwan we're providing surveys, blood sample, and the medical records. 34:06 So in aggregate, yes, more expensive per sample, but, um, uh, less expensive per data point per person. So that's the way we, uh, kind of framed, uh, the discussion with folks. You know, how much more are you getting? 34:21 And what are they really buying? Is it the sample, or are they buying an outcome? 34:26 So trying to understand the pain point first, and then understanding what kind of outcome they would like, and then working backwards as to, you know, your, how your solution fits that outcome, um, and how you can tailor it to that outcome. 34:39 So that's been the other piece. 34:43 Um, then there's another component which is the enterprise level, which is, uh, if you're selling to an early stage, you know, biotech company with a couple hundred employees, you know, they don't have procurement departments the same way that a Pfizer would or Takeda or Vertex or whatever. 34:57 So, um, you know, that sale process is a whole different beast because now you have a business user, and then you have the purchaser, which are two different entities. So what you're gonna have to... 35:10 Well, really, if you're talking about enterprise sales, you're talking about a multi-persona and how to navigate their organization to guide towards the sale. 35:17 So, um, not all customers are just because the person, the scientist performs the same function at multiple different companies, um, it doesn't mean that the organization behaves the same. Does that make sense? Mm-hmm. 35:30 Yeah, it does. And, and I, I really just agree with so much of what you said. 35:35 Um, the, the thing that you said early on about quickly qualifying leads and prospects, I think is so key because people waste a lot of time on, on conversations because they're, they're hearing some positive feedback. 35:49 Um, but quickly understanding, first of all, does the person that you're talking to even have any power over budget? Um, do they have any decision-making ability? 35:58 Um, asking early, what is the decision-making process there? Who needs- Mm-hmm. -to be involved? Who needs to sign off? 36:06 Um, the sooner you can understand that, the sooner you can make sure you're spending your time, um, in the right way. 36:12 So, you know, Brian, one thing I-- you mentioned churn, um, and I know that, that forecasting sales cycles and understanding churn and seasonality is, is something that, that you're really good at. 36:24 Can you share a little bit about the importance of that and kind of how you approach those topics? Yes. Um, so I'll separate the two things. 36:33 The, so the churn, um, we're still trying to evaluate it now, but, um, you know, I think, uh, at least in the pharma space, I think... Dr. Alexandra Greenhill was bringing up the pharmas, um, and getting in there. 36:49 So I think, uh, with regards to pharmaceutical companies, weWe know that most of our continuous growth 37:01 within the, you know, the continuous growth within the company is gonna come from, um, high net revenue retention from those clients, meaning, um, Pfizer has a higher likelihood of growing year over year than is a small biotech company with limited funding for obvious reasons. 37:20 So we, uh, as that relates to commission, we're thinking that, uh, potentially, we haven't implemented this, but, uh, giving higher commission on the public companies versus the private ones, um, and, uh, it's a function of the churn. 37:36 So we're gonna take a look at that. So I would encourage you to think of how you pay out and also who you target based on the likelihood of churn, which you can only do going backwards, but you could use, 37:47 you could use your best judgment, which is a large publicly traded big pharma like Eli, Eli Lilly or Janssen or Johnson & Johnson, whatever, is probably going to, uh, have, uh, less potential churn. 38:00 So that's, uh, component one. The seasonality 38:05 component, so we've been looking at ten K's and annual reports of our publicly traded, uh, competitors, or not even competitors, but, uh, large organizations that operate in our space. 38:15 And what we've seen is that Q3, especially Q4, is when all of the pharma budg-budgets are used and deployed. 38:23 And so to that end, what we've, uh, what we're hoping to do is set up on an annual basis, um, our inbound up-- our outbound prospectors, sorry, in-house sales reps, to hire them in, uh, May, June, July, 38:40 um, right as they're graduating from university, um, which we've had the most success with those folks who've studied, uh, biology, you know, biochemistry undergrad. 38:49 So hire them, have them do two, three months of training, and the maximum, um, opportunity... Well, the, the, um, the prospecting season at Sanguine is September and October. 39:02 Historically, it's when we've seen the highest number of opportunities being created. November, December is highest number of close. 39:09 So we're getting our recruiting, training, and onboarding and, um, uh, essentially deployment, uh, aligned with the sales cycle or seasonality of the business. But that's the way we're, we're looking at that. 39:24 That's really smart. So you don't miss the whole year, right? So you don't wanna hire all those- Yeah... 39:30 you know, for example, these kids out of school, uh, in November, December, and then miss that whole period, that whole year of growth. Mm-hmm. 39:40 Um, yeah, and I think that's just really been one of the themes that's gone throughout this whole hour is just maniacally knowing your customer, um, and get any data that you can get ahold of, including K-one's on your customer, you know, leverage that. 39:56 Um, we're really almost out of time here. Um, I'm just gonna throw out one question for each of you. 40:03 Um, if there's one thing you could tell your, your former self, uh, at the be-- when you were just launching Sanguine and Doctor.com, um, about sales that, that you wish you knew then, what would it be? 40:19 I'll go first, Reed. Um, uh, segmentation is critical. Play to your strengths. So we had closers prospecting and prospectors closing, and we, we didn't do any segmentation there. 40:31 And, uh, we didn't-- also didn't any-- do any segmentation on sales engineering or, like, product specialists. So segment, if you wanna grow, you're gonna have to segment. Segmentation is expensive, fine. 40:42 Then what you'll have to do is make up for it with more prospects and higher likelihood, higher win rate, lower discounting, other metrics like that. So yes, growth is expensive after, you know, a few million dollars. 40:54 Just stay calm and, uh, keep segmenting. Love it. Um, bigger sales are better. Uh, it took us a long time- [laughs]... to, to work into bigger and bigger rooms. 41:10 And that in many ways, like, at the end of the day, some person is gonna decide. 41:15 And so if you're gonna have to convince one person, um, would you rather convince them for, like, four grand or, like, four million dollars? 41:21 And, and so to the extent it's ever possible to go bigger than the sale you're trying to close, go bigger. 41:28 Um, we had some of our m-most exciting moments like that when we would, would bring people in, um, who were new to the business, who'd be like, "Oh, yeah, I could sell this for XYZ." 41:36 And me and Anju would be like, "Really? You think so? Like, that's not what the market has said so far." They're like, "No, no, you watch." And they would go out and they'd do it. And that in many ways, like, 41:44 don't limit yourself to what you've seen before. Like, it's, it's only, it's only impossible until you're doing it. 41:52 And so going for those bigger ticket sales and, and really pushing for that expansion, um, I wish we had done earlier. We probably could have shaved, like, two years off the ten-year journey at least. Mm-hmm. Yeah. 42:07 It's so true. I mean, it can take exactly the same amount of time and energy to, to close fifty thousand dollars as five million. Yeah. Um, that is just so true. 42:18 Um- It's actually often more grueling to close the small ones. It's, it's like, uh- Yeah... real Pareto principle stuff. Totally. Yes. Yes. The, uh, 42:30 smallest percentage of your, your clients will give you the biggest grief. Um, well, thank you. This was so enjoyable. I think super helpful, um, to these fellow health transformers. You guys are, are inspiring. 42:44 Um, proud of what you do. Um, thank you. Thank you for joining us. [outro music]